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Abstract. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially 
computational, and hence computation provides the scientific key to explaining mentality. The 
Representational Theory of  Mind (RTM) holds that representational content is the key feature in 
distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. I argue that there is a deep incompatibility between 
these two theoretical  frameworks, and that the acceptance of CTM provides strong grounds for 
rejecting RTM. The focal point of the incompatibility is the fact that representational content is  
extrinsic to formal procedures as such, and the intended interpretation of syntax makes no difference 
to the execution of an algorithm. So the unique 'content' postulated by RTM is superfluous to the 
formal procedures of CTM. And once these procedures are implemented in a physical mechanism, it 
is exclusively the causal properties of the physical mechanism that are responsible for all aspects of 
the system's behaviour. So once again, postulated content is rendered superfluous. To the extent that 
semantic content may appear to play a role in behaviour, it must be syntactically encoded within the 
system, and just as in a standard computational artefact, so too with the human mind/brain - it's pure 
syntax all the way down to the level of physical implementation. Hence 'content' is at most a  
convenient meta-level gloss, projected from the outside by human theorists, which itself can play no 
role in cognitive processing. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The predominant view in Philosophy, as famously articulated by Fodor (1981) is that “there 
can be no computation without representation”. This assertion is motivated by a particular 
theoretical stance characterized by two fundamental features. One is commitment to the 
widely embraced Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), according to which computation (of 
one sort or another) is held to provide the scientific key to explaining and, in principle, 
reproducing mentality. CTM maintains that cognitive processes are essentially computational 
processes, and hence that intelligence in the natural world arises when a material system 
implements the appropriate kind of computational formalism. The second is commitment to 
the traditionally derived Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), which holds that 
representational content is the key feature in distinguishing mental from non-mental systems.  
 
2. Critique of the Semantic Account of Computation in Physical Systems 
 
The combination of RTM and CTM have given rise to the ‘received view’ as stated above, 
which is conveniently expressed in terms of the Semantic Account (SA) of computational 
implementation, wherein computation in physical systems is stipulated to be the processing 
of representations, and only physical states that are ‘representational’ can serve as 
realizations of abstract formal procedures. However, I will argue that SA is infelicitous for a 
variety of reasons, and constitutes an unwarranted restriction on the global notion of 
computation in physical systems.  The SA is infelicitous because: 
 (1) It advocates a departure from the Mathematical Theory Computation (MTC), 
whereas MTC is the canonical source of our overall theoretical grasp of computation as a 
cogent and well defined notion. Central to MTC is the intuitive idea of an effective or 
‘mechanical’ procedure, which is simply a finite set of instructions for syntactic 
manipulations that can be followed by a machine, or by a human being who is capable of 
carrying out only very elementary operations on symbols. A definitional constraint is that the 
machine or the human can follow the rules without knowing what the ‘symbols’ are supposed 
to mean.  
There are any number of different possible frameworks for filling in the details and 
providing a particular specification of the basic idea. Turing’s (1936) ‘automatic computing 
machines’ supply a very intuitive and elegant rendition of the notion of an effective 
procedure, but there is a well known variety of alternative frameworks, including Church’s 
Lambda Calculus, Gödel’s Recursive Function Theory, Lambek’s Infinite Abacus Machines, 
etc. According to the widely accepted Church-Turing thesis, the notion of computability is 
nonetheless captured in a mathematically absolute sense by the notion of TM computability, 
and every alternative formalization thus far given of the intuitive notion of an effective 
procedure has been demonstrated to be equivalently powerful, and hence to be coextensive 
(and ‘non-classical’ methods such as connectionism, quantum and analogue computation do 
not transgress this boundary). The underlying commonality in these frameworks is simply 
that the rules are finitary and can proceed without any additional interpretation or 
understanding. As Egan (1995, 2010), Piccinini (2006, 2015) and others have aptly observed, 
representational content plays no role whatever in MTC  
 (2) MTC is crystal clear and mathematically precise, while the further restrictive 
notion of ‘representation/reference’ invoked by SA is both vague and problematic. Hence this 
is a retrograde step from clarity and generality to narrowness and potential obscurity. Indeed, 
given the notorious difficulties in providing a satisfactory rendition of ‘representation’ in 
objective scientific terms, SA is in the rather ironic position of promulgating a global 
restriction on the notion of computation in the physical world that is itself unlikely to be 
successfully naturalized. More on this point to follow. 
 (3) Our computational artefacts are the paradigmatic instances of physical 
computation and can yield any number of counterexamples to SA. As a simple case in point, 
consider a rudimentary Finite State Machine that accepts some regular language L. The FSM 
operates on strings of uninterpreted syntax and determines whether or not the arbitrary 
concatenations are grammatically correct. This is an exemplary case of computational 
processing where absolutely no semantics nor representational content is involved. Or 
consider a Turing machine intended to compute the values of a particular truth function, say 
inclusive disjunction. The machine itself is a program for manipulating the symbols ‘0’ and 
‘1’ on given input tapes, where ‘0’ is intended to denote False and‘1’ denotes True. As such, 
it can easily be reinterpreted as computing the truth function associated with conjunction 
instead of disjunction, simply by flipping the intended reference of the manipulated symbols 
so that ‘0’ denotes True and ‘1’ denotes False. There is no independent fact of the matter 
regarding what these syntactic tokens ‘really mean’ − their referential value is entirely 
dependent upon a conventional scheme of interpretation which is not itself specified or 
determined by the computational activities of the Turing machine. The formal behaviour of 
the device is the same in either case, and the rule governed procedure can be executed with 
no projected interpretation at all. Indeed, this is precisely what happens with our 
electromechanical artefacts that successfully run formal programming languages in the 
absence of any external semantics.  
 (4) The preceding point highlights an essential flaw related to (1) above: computation 
is essentially pure syntax manipulation, and how the syntax is interpreted is an additional 
feature not intrinsic to computation per se, nor to the successful execution of a formal 
procedure. SA stipulates that this extrinsic feature is essential, even though the discipline of 
Computer Science makes no such claim. Hence SA commits the fundamental error of 
conflating ‘computation’ simpliciter with ‘syntax manipulation under an intended 
interpretation’. For example, Sprevak (2010) argues for the necessity of taking semantics into 
account when individuating computations, because, as above, it is not possible to say which 
truth function is being computed on the basis of syntactic manipulation alone. And while it is 
certainly true (and a ubiquitous fact in logic and model theory) that formal syntax 
underdetermines an intended interpretation, I would argue that the computation itself is 
determined by the formal procedure alone, and whatever semantic value we decide to 
attribute to the formalism should be seen as a separate question belonging to a distinct level 
of analysis. More will be said about this in the following section (see also Dewhurst 2016 for 
an allied critique of SA).  
  
In response to these infelicities, I would contend that SA is not a viable approach to physical 
computation. And it's salient to emphasize that the primary reason for making this conflation 
and attempting to tether the notion of computation to some story about representation does 
not stem from any issues concerning the general theory of computation itself, but rather is 
driven by a particular stance within a specialized explanatory project in the philosophy of 
mind. And this is an unduly parochial motivation for promulgating restrictions on the notion 
of computation in general. All that strictly follows from the conjunction of RTM and CTM is 
that computation in cognitive systems must involve representational content. Hence the more 
modest received view should instead be the qualified claim that there can be no cognitive 
computation without representation. So RTM plus CTM simply yields the Computational-
Representational Theory of Mind (CRTM), which in itself entails nothing about computation 
in non-mental systems. 
 
Having narrowed the received view from an unwarranted claim about physically 
implemented computations in general, to its more fitting status as a claim about computations 
within the specialized realm of cognitive systems, I will now argue that even within this 
restricted field of application it should not be accepted. There is a fundamental 
incompatibility between CTM and RTM, which makes CRTM an unstable foundation for a 
scientific study of the mind. CRTM attempts to wed an ill-defined and pre-scientific criterion 
of mentality to a formal, mathematical paradigm, whilst I will argue that the two components 
are actually quite unsuited bedfellows, and that a serious commitment to CTM provides 
strong grounds for rejecting RTM.  
 3.    Semantics, Syntax and Formalization 
 
CTM and CRTM have arisen within a pre-existing background context supplied by the rapid 
development and success of formal methods that began in logic and the foundations of 
mathematics, particularly in the late 19th century. Traditionally, when we formalize a 
particular domain of investigation, as in branches of logic and mathematics, we start with our 
understanding of that domain ‒ with our conceptual grasp of the intended model.  In such 
cases the semantic content comes first, and we then devise syntactic systems to capture or 
reflect crucial aspects of the intended interpretation. The historical roots of this approach can 
be found in Euclid's project of axiomatizing intuitive geometrical concepts and then 
rigorously deducing the consequences as theorems.  
 
And in the realm of basic logic we start, for example, with our conceptual grasp of the 
material conditional as a binary truth function, and then formalize this semantic ‘content’ 
with the syntactic derivation rule of modus ponens:   
                                   A,  A → B  ⊢  B  
And contra SA, given this rule it's clearly possible to manipulate symbols in a formal 
derivation without knowing the truth-table for ‘→’. Or when formalizing elementary number 
theory, we begin with our intuitive grasp of the numerical operations of addition and 
multiplication. We then capture this meaning computationally with the recursive axioms of 
Peano arithmetic:  
 ∀x(x + o = x) 
 ∀x∀y(x + y′) = (x + y)′  
     and 
  ∀x(x ∙ o = o) 
 ∀x∀y(x ∙ y′) = (x ∙ y) + x 
This gives us a mechanical, purely syntactical handle on the intended semantical domain. 
Ultimately, we can then extend and perfect Euclid's original method to produce formal 
systems that can be manipulated automatically, and hence carry out purely rule governed 
transformations that preserve truth with respect to this domain. Indeed, this is why our 
computational artifacts are so invaluable: they perform high speed transformations 
mechanically and automatically that we can then interpret with respect to our intended model 
and thereby discover new truths about that domain. Hence this facilitates the acquisition of 
vast quantities of new knowledge. In this case we don’t say that the realm of elementary 
number theory itself is computational or formal, but rather that we have provided a 
formalization of our intended model.   
 
So when it comes to Cognitive Science and AI, one possibility with respect to computational 
methods is that (I) we try to formalize the human mind, starting with the assumption that it is 
some autonomous semantical/representational domain, perhaps comparable to number theory 
or Euclidean geometry, and we want to devise an automatic formal system reflecting this 
domain. Approach (I) is in harmony with the traditional conception of mind that underlies 
and motivates RTM. Of course, (I) entails nothing about physicalism (and is entirely 
compatible with dualism), nor does it assert anything about the computational basis of human 
intelligence. All it claims is that we can (partially) 'capture' a given domain using formal 
methods, in the sense that rule governed transformations will preserve truth in that domain.  
 
This approach is extremely powerful and general, and has been deployed successfully in a 
number of areas. For example by adding appropriate non-logical axioms (including 
Carnapian 'meaning postulates'), Montague Grammar is able to formalize an impressively 
large fragment of English within a system of higher-order modal. And by axiomatizing the 
salient natural laws we can formalize scientific theories such a physics. Additionally, in more 
specialized fields where the dynamical regularities are known we can computationally model 
a host of phenomena including earthquakes, economics, climate change, hurricanes, particle 
collisions, protein folding, molecular properties of materials, etc. And such an approach is 
compatible with ‘weak’ versions of AI ‒ if we could formalize the human mind, then 
regardless of its metaphysical status, we could in principle build a computer that simulates 
this phenomenon. This might then result in artificial humanoid robots that were internally and 
metaphysically much different than humans, but were nonetheless able to pass a Total Turing 
Test. 
 
4. The Computational Paradigm 
However the CTM view is far stronger and more substantive than this. It contends that (II) 
human cognition is itself essentially computational and that the brain literally implements 
formal procedures, and so is directly comparable to a computational artifact. Rather than just 
formally simulating the mind as in scenario (I), this approach attempts to provide a 
naturalistic explanation of mentality in computational terms. So on this view, computation is 
not a mere simulational or ‘engineering’ technique, but rather is held to provide the scientific 
key to cognition. According to the Computational Paradigm, mental states and properties are 
to be literally described and understood as internal computational processes mediating the 
inputs and outputs of intelligent behavior. In this manner, computation holds the key not only 
to explaining mentality in the natural world, but also to the possibility of reproducing it 
artificially, and hence is central to the project of ‘strong’ AI. 
 
This robust CTM view has a number of theoretical advantages and attractions that are worth 
reviewing. To begin with, CTM can utilize the relationship between the program level and its 
realization in physical hardware to provide an elegant solution to the longstanding mind/body 
problem: according to the mind/program analogy the mind is to the brain as a program is to 
the electromechanical hardware of a digital computer. In turn, the mind/program analogy 
offers a compelling solution to the problem of mental causation. Mental processes are 
analyzed in terms of ‘cognitive software’ implemented in the neurophysiological ‘wetware’ 
of the brain, and any mental event leading to an action will be realized in terms of a physical 
brain process. For example, the mental event constituted by my desire to raise my right arm is 
seen as a computational process implemented by my brain, which in turn results in a neuronal 
firing that activates the salient nerves controlling my muscles and causing my right arm to 
rise. No physical conservation laws are violated, and no dualistic ‘pre-established harmonies’ 
are required. 
 Another key virtue of CTM is that, as above, the formal transformation rules can be followed 
‘mindlessly’ i.e. without any outside interpretation or understanding. Classical computation is 
a process of mechanistically determined transitions from one configuration to the next, and 
this is very clearly illustrated by the conditional instructions that define a particular Turing 
Machine. Each instruction is of the form: if in state Qi reading symbol Sj then perform action 
An (either print a discrete symbol from the prespecified alphabet, or else move one square to 
the left or right) and enter state Qm (where m=i is permissible). As required by the notion of 
an effective procedure, these instructions which determine the sequence of transitions on a 
given input are executed without any reference to what the manipulated 'symbols' may or 
may not denote.  
 
So just as in a standard computer, the abstract operations implemented by the brain can be 
executed without any accompanying semantics. Hence, in principle at least, the ‘intentional 
homunculus’ can be fully discharged, and a properly mechanistic and scientific explanation 
thereby attained. Mentality in the natural world can be accounted for in terms of physically 
instantiated procedures that do not require any intentional or mentalistic residue. If our 
mental abilities are essentially computational/formal, then there is no need to invoke any 
elusive and mysterious phenomena outside the normal posits of natural science. This is a 
profoundly significant theoretical gain, and one of the prime scientific strengths of the 
computational approach. Just as with a standard computational artifact, formal structure and 
physical law are all that are required to account for intelligence in the natural world. Such a 
definitive and powerful solution to the problem of the physical, non-dualistic basis of 
mentality was not even remotely available prior to the 20
th
 century. 
 
Additionally, CTM is in perfect accord with the principles of methodological solipsism and 
psychological autonomy. Methodological solipsism holds that the study of cognitive 
processes should consider those processes in abstraction from the environment in which the 
subject is placed. It's historical roots go back at least as far as Descartes, where skeptical 
doubt was fuelled by the fact that one's subjective mental realm is compatible with any 
number of different external circumstances and causes. Analogously, since formal calculi can 
be manipulated without any appeal to an interpretation, they are internally ‘self-sufficient’ 
and independent of the ‘external world’ of their intended meaning. So in this regard it is 
fitting to view them in narrow or solipsistic terms. They are incapable of determining a 
unique interpretation, and cannot distinguish between any number of alternative models.  
 
This fact can be encapsulated in the observation that the relation between syntax and 
semantics is fundamentally one-to-many; any given formal system will have arbitrarily many 
different interpretations, just as the same narrow psychological state is compatible with a 
limitless variety of distal sources of input stimuli. To use the classic example introduced by 
Putnam (1975), if Oscar1 from Earth is transported to Twin Earth, he’ll be in exactly the same 
psychological state when viewing ‘water’, even though on Earth this state was induced by 
environmental H2O while now it is induced by XYZ.  
 
Part of the theoretical appeal of methodological solipsism is that it follows as a consequence 
of the perhaps deeper principle of psychological autonomy (Stich 1983), which holds that all 
the properties relevant to the psychological explanation of a given agent must supervene upon 
their current, internal physical properties.  In other words, the mental is fully supervenient 
upon the brain/central nervous system, and thus the external environment can produce 
changes in the mental states and properties of a subject only insofar as it produces changes in 
the physical configuration of their brain. Thus the principle of psychological autonomy 
identifies the boundaries of the cognitive system with the traditionally conceived boundaries 
of the organism, also coinciding with the causal locus of behavior, the seat of executive 
control, and the conceptually basic 'individual unit' stemming from the inherited genotype. 
This localization is of course contested by the extended mind hypothesis of Clark and 
Chalmers (1998). The current paper will not address the attendant controversy, but will 
simply advocate the non-extended model, which, along with its many other virtues, also 
corresponds admirably with the input/output boundaries of a standard computational 
formalism, and hence is in straightforward accord with CTM.   
 
Thus far CTM exhibits an impressive degree of theoretical integrity and power:  
     (i) providing an elucidation of the (historically vexed) relation between mind and brain,  
     (ii) solving the problem of mental causation,  
     (iii) discharging the intentional homunculus,  
     (iv) preserving the traditionally conceived input/output boundaries of the organism 
     (v) providing an account of our cognitive capacities using only the normal  
            resources of the natural sciences 
     (vi) all within a framework perfectly compatible with the core principle of psychological  
          autonomy. 
But now the theoretical waters become seriously muddied… 
 
5.   The Postulation of Cognitive ‘Content’  
According to the traditional conception of the mind, semantical content is perhaps the most 
important feature distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. For example, in the 
scholastic tradition revived by Brentano (1874), the essential feature of mental states is their 
‘aboutness’ or inherent representational aspect. Searle (1980, 1992) embraces this view with 
his claim that intrinsic intentionality is the essential attribute possessed by minds, and the 
feature that must be reproduced in an artefact if (strong) AI is to succeed. And the traditional 
conception has been incorporated into the foundations of contemporary scientific approaches 
to the mind, insofar as the notion of ‘mental representation’ is adopted as a primary 
theoretical device. For example, in classical (e.g. Fodorian) cognitive science, Brentano’s 
legacy is preserved in the view that the properly cognitive level is distinguished precisely by 
appeal to representational content. There are many different levels of description and 
explanation in the natural world, from quarks all the way to quasars, and according to Fodor, 
it is only when the states of a system are treated as representational, that is, when they are 
construed as having a content that is really about something, that we are dealing with the 
cognitive level.  
Hence the traditionally derived RTM holds that semantic content is essential to mentality. As 
noted, this view is potentially compatible with approach (I). But Fodor and many others 
instead attempt to wed RTM with the computational paradigm of approach (II), to yield a 
theoretical mutation in the form of CRTM. CTM syntax is (multiply) semantically 
interpretable, and advocates of CRTM would use this opening toehold to try and imbue it 
with the canonical and venerated ‘real content’ held to distinguish cognitive from non-
cognitive systems. On the CRTM view cognitive agents are described as ‘Semantic Engines’ 
‒ automatic formal systems replete with the unique and privileged interpretation postulated 
by RTM. Hence the computational syntax of CTM is seen as the ‘vehicle’ for the essential 
content that is lauded as the hallmark of the mental.                                     
 
But the first thing to note is that the idea of a ‘Semantic Engine’ is fundamentally misguided. 
Only the syntax is mechanized, while the assigned content remains totally inert. As above, 
the basic purpose of interpreting a formal system is so that we may use the Syntactic Engine 
to discover new truths of our intended model. The model itself does no mechanical work, 
which is precisely why the formalization can supply an epistemic payoff. Since computation 
is a series of manipulations performed on uninterpreted syntax, the purported content of 
mental ‘representations’ is rendered superfluous to the computations that comprise the 
cognitive processes of CTM. In line with both the principle of methodological solipsism and 
the definition of an effective procedure, the intended interpretation of internal syntax makes 
absolutely no difference to the formal mechanics of mind. Thus in the transition to CRTM, 
one of the prime virtues of a computational approach to mentality has been lost ‒ the 
discharged homunculus has been smuggled back in. And quite ironically, he now has no real 
work to do but is just going along for the ride.  
 
5.1  The Narrow Version 
Fodor's original notion of mental content was narrow, and this is in line with the principle of 
psychological autonomy, as well as the orthodox view that content is cognitively and causally 
relevant to an agent's behaviour, and is central to the project of psychological explanation. 
Furthermore, since narrow content is a feature sustained by the individual mental subject, it is 
directly in line with the traditional notions of intentionality and mentality from which it 
derives. Fodor (1994) has since relinquished this view and embraced the notion of wide 
content. I will argue that both of these positions are mistaken, but will start with a critique of 
the narrow view, since it is more natural in the context of  psychological theorizing, and is 
more closely aligned with the time-honoured assumptions underlying RTM and consequently 
CRTM. 
 
According to Fodor’s Language of Thought hypothesis (1975, 2008), henceforth LOT, 
mental processes are explicitly viewed as formal operations on a linguistically structured 
system of internal symbols. In addition, the LOT incorporates the widely accepted belief-
desire framework of psychological explanation, which holds that an agent’s rational actions 
are both caused and explained by intentional states such as belief and desire. On the LOT 
model, these states are sustained via sentences in the head that are formally manipulated by 
the cognitive processes which lead to actions. Hence propositional attitude states are treated 
as computational relations to sentences in an internal processing language, and where the 
LOT sentence serves to represent or encode the propositional content of the intentional state. 
Symbolic representations are thus posited as the internal structures that carry the information 
utilized by intelligent systems, and they also comprise the formal elements over which 
cognitive computations are performed.  
 
Because the tokens of LOT are semantically interpretable and physically realizable in the 
human brain, they are seen to form a key theoretical bridge between content and causation. 
So at first pass, this CRTM approach might seem to provide a harmonious theory of the 
mind/brain, potentially uniting the traditional notion of mental representation with the 
causally efficacious level of neural machinery. Indeed, this may (possibly?) be why the 
CRTM approach has such widespread appeal and has become the entrenched orthodox view. 
But alas, as argued above, a fatal tension is already built into the foundations of the picture: a 
central purpose of the symbolic structures is to carry content, and yet, to the extent that they 
are formal elements of computation, their alleged content is completely gratuitous. 
Computation is a series of manipulations performed on uninterpreted syntax, and formal 
structure alone is sufficient for all effective procedures. Indeed, on the foregoing 
mind/program analogy central to CTM, there is a formal procedure or program, while the 
level of meaning is conspicuously absent. The purported content of mental ‘representations’ 
postulated by CRTM is superfluous to the computations that comprise the ‘cognitive’ 
processes of cognitive science.  
 
So an obvious move at this point is the one made by Stich (1983) with his Syntactical Theory 
of Mind (STM) ‒ strip the LOT of its extraneous meaning and let the internal syntactic 
engine churn away on its own. This move is criticized by Crane (1990), who argues that we 
can't have LOT syntax without attributing semantics. But I think Crane's argument simply 
reduces to the epistemological claim that outside human theorists would not be able to 
recognize and catalogue the relevant sentences of LOT without first interpreting them. 
However, even if this were true, it would make no difference to the formal operation of the 
machinery itself and hence to the actual structure and behaviour of cognitive agents. And 
what would this attribution of meaning boil down to, other than a case of third person 
observers assigning some selected sentence of their own public language to a given piece of 
LOT syntax?   
 
A more serious problem with Stich's STM is that it retains LOT's naive commitment to the 
common sense categories of belief-desire explanation, and the rather simplistic attribution of 
privileged and discrete units of innate syntax directly corresponding to our pre-scientific 
attributions of mental content. Thus when, in everyday practice, we justifiably ascribe to 
Jones the belief that lager quenches thirst, both Fodor and Stich would have it that a token of 
the appropriate mentalese sentence, say ‘n%^7 £#~ %&!+’, has been duly etched into her 
‘belief box’. This neuronal implementation of mentalese syntax is then poised to interact with 
other physically implemented tokens in her desire box to produce assorted forms of rational 
action, such as standing up and reaching for a pint. Additionally, Fodor would contend that 
‘n%^7 £#~ %&!+’ encodes the very same propositional content as the English sentence 
‘lager quenches thirst’. Stich rightly notes that this purported content adds nothing to the 
causal efficacy of the internal syntax so will have no influence on what happens.  However, 
he is still committed to a direct correspondence between common sense public language 
attributions and fundamental cognitive architecture. I do not wish to become entangled in the 
‘Folk Psychology’ debate at the present time, and hence will not critically assess this move in 
terms of its scientific plausibility. Instead I will diagnose what I take to be an underlying 
conflation between two related but quite distinct theoretical endeavours, and argue that there 
is a very significant difference between a theory of natural language semantics and a 
psychological theory regarding the internal states causally responsible for our input/output 
profiles. This theme will be further developed below. 
 
5.2   Content Goes Wide 
 
Mental processes and natural language semantics clearly have many intimate philosophical 
connections, and the foregoing one-to-many relation that underlies the ‘symbol grounding 
problem’ has striking and well known consequences for the linguistic theory of meaning. If 
one accepts the principle of psychological autonomy, then it follows that the mind is too 
weak to determine what its internal components are ‘really about’, and this extends to the 
case of expressions in natural language as well. The famed conclusion of Putnam’s Twin 
Earth argument (Putnam 1975) is that “meanings ain’t in the head”, and this is because 
narrow psychological states are incapable of determining the reference relation for terms in 
our public languages. But rather than abandon natural language semantics in light of the 
problem, the externalist quite rightly abandons the traditional idea that the intentionality of 
individuals' mental states provides the foundation for linguistic reference.  
 
Putnam’s strategy is to directly invoke external circumstances in the characterization of 
meaning for public languages. The externalist approach exploits direct indexical and 
ostensive access to the world, thus circumventing the difficulty by relieving mental states of 
their referential burden. On such an approach, the object of reference can only be specified by 
indexical appeal to the object itself, and in principle it cannot be determined merely from the 
psychological states of the language user. Direct appeal to the actual environment and 
linguistic community in which the cognitive agent is situated then plays the principal role in 
determining the match-up between language and world. Putnam’s strategy offers a viable 
account of linguistic reference precisely because it transgresses the boundaries of the mind as 
assumed by the explanatory project of (classical) cognitive science. The externalist must 
invoke broad environmental factors, since nothing internal to a cognitive system is capable of 
uniquely capturing the purported ‘content’ of its representations and thereby semantically 
grounding its internal states. And from this it follows that content is not a property of the 
representation qua cognitive structure, and hence it is not the internal structure nor the 
cognitive system itself that provides the theoretical basis for meaning. Indeed, outside factors 
then do the real work, and the purported semantical aspect of cognitive processing is (once 
again) trivialized. 
In light of these considerations, many philosophers (including Fodor 1994, who has now 
apparently changed his stand again in 2015) have abandoned the traditional notion of narrow 
content in favour of a wide reading. And while this is an apt move when providing an 
analysis of the semantics of public languages, I would argue that at this point the theoretical 
projects of natural language semantics on the one hand, and the study of cognitive systems on 
the other, should be kept clearly distinct. The primary thesis of the current paper is that a 
genuinely computational approach to cognitive systems has no place for semantic content, 
since semantics is extrinsic to computation per se, and the intended interpretation of a given 
cognitive formalism will make no difference whatever to the computational processes 
involved. To the extent that semantic value can appear to play a role, it must be syntactically 
encoded within the system. This is a fundamentally ‘internalist’ constraint, and is in harmony 
with the principle of psychological autonomy. Similarly, the type of wide content postulated 
by an externalist approach to natural language semantics will be causally irrelevant to the 
behavior of a cognitive system. As Clark and Chalmers (1998) rightly observe, this type of 
externalism is ‘explanatory impotent’, in the sense that the difference in the meaning of 
‘water’ on Earth and Twin Earth will make no difference to the behavior of Oscar1 or Oscar2 
because their narrow psychological states are still identical. And I would take this as a basic 
limitation on content of any sort, be it narrow or wide, ‘naturalized’ or otherwise ‒ if 
difference in the purported content is not manifested via a difference in actual cognitive 
configuration, then it will have no impact on the activity of the system.  
In contrast to Clark and Chalmers, I accept the principle of psychological autonomy, and the 
associated narrow conception of psychological states. Hence I would argue that, within the 
context of CTM, nothing that is not part of the internal syntactical machinery of a cognitive 
system can play an efficacious role in its computational cognitive processing. Of course, 
causation in general is a subtle and controversial topic, and some philosophers, including 
Shagrir (2001) and Rescorla (2014), reject this narrow conception and hold that wide content 
can play a causal role. It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to engage such claims 
in detail, but as a broad-spectrum response I would argue that if the framework being 
advocated is a computational approach to the mind, and if the description of the effective 
procedure in question is held fixed, then the latter is by definition sufficient to account for all 
well-defined input/output data.  
So if wide or external factors are said to have a causal influence on cognitive processes, 
where this influence is not ultimately manifested in terms of internal syntactic structure, then 
either one of two possibilities must be the case. The first is that mysterious and completely 
unspecified ‘forces’ are ‘acting at a distance’ to influence the system, and hence more than 
computational resources are required to account for these mysterious forces, in which case 
CTM proper has been tacitly abandoned. The other possibility is that the computational 
formalism in question is being covertly re-described to include formerly ‘external’ factors 
which now play a procedurally specifiable role. And in this case the effective procedure in 
question has not been held fixed, but has been implicitly expanded so that elements of the 
overall context that were previously outside the original input/output boundaries of the 
formalism have now become internalized. 
Classical CTM is allegedly committed to viewing the human brain on the model of a piece of 
computational hardware, and in general the explanatory project of CTM derives from 
adopting a perspective that originates within the discipline of computer science. And when 
designing a piece of electromechanical hardware, professional engineers only take into 
account (the very well understood) processes of internal physical causation for inventing and 
constructing the machines used to implement specific computational formalisms. A designed 
computational artefact is still an open physical system, and is susceptible to any number of 
non-design-intended outside forces. If it turns out that some external factor is exerting a 
causal effect on an implemented computation, then this effect must be manifested in terms of 
a change to the internal physical structure of the hardware device, which physical change in 
turn has an impact on the computational activity in question.  
For example, if I run my laptop in a location where it is exposed to direct and very intense 
sunlight, then the received solar radiation may cause internal components to overheat and this 
may affect the computational activity of my Windows 10 operating system. External solar 
radiation is exerting a causal impact on the internal computational processing, but this can 
happen only because there is an internal physical change in the form of components 
overheating. However, external solar radiation is not itself a relevant ‘input’ at the 
computational level of description, and computer scientists and electrical engineers are not in 
need of any notion of ‘wide content’ to fully explain the phenomena at issue. Accordingly I 
would argue that if philosophers advocate an appeal to some mysterious form of ‘wide’ 
causation as being necessary for the explanation of cognitive systems, then they are implicitly 
transgressing the bounds of a genuinely computational approach to the mind. And without a 
well developed account of how this causal influence takes place, their accompanying story 
regarding the dynamics of the underlying medium of physical implementation will be very 
curious indeed.    
 
6.  ‘Representation’ Talk as a Purely Pragmatic Device   
 
There have been a number of positions advanced in negative reaction to ‘orthodox’ cognitive 
science that take anti-representationalism as one of their hallmarks, including dynamical 
systems theory (e.g Van Gelder 1996), behaviour based robotics (e.g. Brooks 1996), sensory-
motor affordances and enactivism (e.g. Noё 2004, Hutto & Myin 2013). and various forms of 
connectionism. A common factor is that these views all advance some version of the slogan 
‘intelligence without representation’. In order to locate my position on the salient 
philosophical landscape, it is important to note that it is not anti-representational in this sense. 
Contrary to the foregoing positions, I would not deny that the most plausible forms of 
cognitive architecture may well incorporate internal structures and stand-ins that many people 
would be tempted to call ‘representations’, especially at the levels of perception, sensory-
motor control and navigation. So I would be happy to accept things like spatial encodings, 
somatic emulators, cognitive maps and internal mirrorings of relevant aspects of the external 
environment. But I would argue that the ‘representation’ label should be construed in a 
deflationary and purely operational sense, and should not be conflated with the more robust 
traditional conception from which it derives. To the extent that internal structures can be said 
to encode, mirror or model external objects and states of affairs, they do so via their own 
causal and/or syntactic properties. And again, to the extent that they influence behaviour or 
the internal processing of inputs to yield outputs, they do this solely in virtue of their internal 
causal and/or syntactic attributes. There is no content involved. 
 
So what I deny is not that there may be internal mechanisms that reflect or co-vary with 
external properties and relations in systematic and biologically useful ways. Instead I would 
deny that there is anything more to this phenomenon than highly sensitive and historically 
evolved relations of calibration between the internal workings of an organism and its 
specialized environmental context. This is a naturalistic description of the system at the  
‘object’ level, and in principle is sufficient to account for all physically tangible interactions 
and to predict future behaviour on the basis of inputs to the system. And at this level 
‘representational  content’ plays no role. Human theorists may then analyze the overall 
history and environmental context of the system, and from an outside meta level choose to 
project external ‘content’ onto various internal structures and processes. But this is a purely 
extrinsic gloss, and there is nothing about these structures, qua efficacious elements of 
internal processing, that is ‘about’ anything else.  From the point of view of the system, these 
structures are manipulated directly, and the notion that they are ‘directed towards’ something 
else plays no role in the pathways leading to intelligent behaviour. Content is not an explicit 
component of the input, nor is it acted upon or transformed via cognitive computations. In 
Chomsky’s (1995) words, 
 There is no meaningful question about the ‘content’ of the internal representations of 
 a person seeing a cube... or about the content of a frog’s ‘representation of’ a fly or of 
 a moving dot in the standard experimental studies of frog vision. No notion like 
 ‘content’, or ‘representation of’, figures within the theory, so there are no answers to 
 be given as to their nature.  
The meta-level content postulated by some outside human observers has no computational or 
causal efficacy, and to the extent that semantic value can appear to play a role it must be 
syntactically encoded within the system. Indeed, just as in a standard computational artefact 
so too with the human mind/brain ‒ it's pure syntax all the way down to the level of physical 
implementation.  
The internal organization of a given biological system may enable it to achieve certain 
externally specified goals, and the evolutionary history of the system and consideration of 
various selectional pressures can shed light on the dynamics of how this has transpired over 
time. At relatively low functional levels such as perception/navigation/nutrition etc. it is 
perhaps convenient to abbreviate this by saying that certain internal structures 'represent' 
external objects and properties, because biologically useful and/or systematic correlations 
will obtain. And the consideration of wide environmental factors may help us understand why 
certain types of randomly evolved correlations constitute a survival advantage, and even 
enable us to look for mechanisms in organisms which would optimize fitness in such a 
context. 
 
For example, Shagrir (2014) considers the neural integrator in the oculomotor system. The 
scientific account is that the system produces eye-position codes by computing mathematical 
integration over eye-velocity encoded inputs, thereby enabling the brain to move the eyes to 
the right position. Furthermore, researchers knew beforehand that integration was the 
function that had to be computed in order for this task to be achieved, and this guided their 
search for the corresponding neural mechanism. In this case there is compelling reason to 
view the internal brain process as mirroring or calibrating itself with distal factors in order to 
successfully control eye position. So one could say that the internal mechanism is a 
'representation', if all this means is that there is a clear relation of calibration. But the vital 
point to note is that content plays no role in these mechanisms. 
 
So I would view 'representation' talk as nothing more than potentially convenient shorthand 
for such basic mechanical facts. And rather than constituting an 'intrinsic' or essential feature 
distinguishing mental from non-mental systems, the attribution of 'content' is a traditionally 
derived form of speech that we can sometimes find useful or satisfying. It is a matter of 
convenience, convention and choice, and does not reveal any fundamental or independent 
fact of the matter. There isn’t a sense in which it’s possible to go wrong or be mistaken about 
what an internal configuration is ‘really’ about. The pragmatic value of representation talk 
will depend on different considerations in different applications and contexts of use − so no 
overarching necessary and sufficient conditions nor univocal meaning. In short, there is no 
deep issue requiring abstruse and protracted philosophical ‘solution’. 
 7.  Behavior versus Meaning 
 
It's clearly the case that many philosophers are of a contrary opinion on the matter, and there 
have been any number of attempts to ‘naturalize’ representational content, where the goal is 
to isolate some unique, privileged and objectively warranted semantic value. The associated 
literature is vast, and it is well beyond the scope of the current discussion to engage the 
various positions. As above, my overall view is that within the context of a computational 
approach to the mind, semantic value per se will play no role, whether or not it can be 
naturalized. However, below I will address a theme introduced earlier in the discussion 
concerning LOT and the belief-desire framework, and offer a few high level critical 
considerations regarding the philosophical quest to naturalize the content of propositional 
attitude states.   
The main foundations appealed to in the general naturalization project are causal, 
informational, and functional/teleological, and one of the predominant current views is the 
teleosemantic approach stemming from the work of Dretske (1981, 1995) and Millikan 
(1984, 1986). The technical notion of ‘information’ does not offer a sufficient basis, given 
that the mathematically clear and precise analysis provided by Shannon (1948) is purely 
quantitative and has nothing to say about semantic interpretation (as with MTC!). Hence the 
additional resources of biological function are invoked, wherein a state of a system is said to 
represent a piece of information only if this is its proper biological function. So the burden of 
the intentional homunculus is now shifted to the ‘purposiveness’ of biological ‘design’.  
In the case of low level phenomena such as sensation one can play this type of 'naturalistic 
content attribution game' if one chooses ‒ there is certainly nothing to prevent it. However in 
the case of high level mental states such as belief and desire the situation becomes much 
different. A frog may possess an internal structure that tracks the motion of a fly and enables 
it to snap at the appropriate moment to capture its food, and which has conferred upon it's 
ancestors a selectional advantage at some stage in the past. In this case there are determinate 
objects in the external world that can be correlated with the relevant internal mechanisms of 
the frog.  So there is a causally and empirically specifiable process that can be used as the 
foundation for 'representation' talk, if one is inclined to describe things in such a way.  
 
But in the case of high level mental states such as propositionally individuated beliefs, there 
is no such determinate object or entity with which an internal processing structure can be 
mapped or correlated. There is no causal history of mechanical interaction that can be used as 
a foundation for the story. According to LOT, there is an internal configuration, a sentence of 
mentalese, which directly corresponds to the belief. But unlike the case of a fly, there is 
nothing to which this internal sentence can be correlated. Beliefs are typically said to have 
propositional content, and such content involves a leap of abstraction many orders of 
magnitude beyond sensation or singular reference. There are various attempts to bridge this 
gap using the resources of control theory, cognitive maps and anticipatory mechanisms. For 
example, Milkowski (2015) argues that anticipatory mechanisms used to explain the 
navigational capabilities of rats can provide the basis for the satisfaction conditions required 
for rich content. And while it may be true that such mechanisms can enable us to explain and 
predict rat behaviour, this still falls far short of providing a foundation for propositional 
content. Rat behaviour must have a purely naturalistic cause, and is itself an empirical 
phenomenon that we can observe and predict.  
 
In sharp contrast, the propositional content traditionally associated with human belief states 
cannot be captured by mere behaviour and aspects of the physical system and its 
environment. The propositional content is expressed via sentences in some public language, 
and the standard approach is to then look for internal structures or processes and relations 
between agent and external context which can ‘bear’ or somehow ‘naturalize’ this attributed 
content. But alas, there is absolutely nothing in my brain or its interactions with the world 
that can be identified or correlated with the propositional content of the English sentence, e.g. 
‘There is no greatest prime number’, or ‘The ancient Greeks believed in Zeus’, or ‘It is not 
possible for Mary to be taller than herself’.  There must indeed be some property of me as a 
biological organism embedded in a particular sociolinguistic community which underlies my 
disposition to assent to such sentences and deny others, but the propositional content itself 
and its satisfaction conditions far outstrip the realm of physical space-time. 
So, as above, I would argue that a line must be drawn between two apparently related but 
nonetheless quite distinct theoretical projects. There is major separation between a theory of 
natural language semantics and a psychological theory regarding the internal states causally 
responsible for our input/output profiles. The former is a highly idealized and normative 
endeavour, concerned with articulating abstract characterizations which reflect the socially 
agreed truth-conditions for sentences in a public language. As such, this endeavour has no 
direct bearing on an essentially descriptive account of the internal mechanisms responsible 
for processing cognitive inputs and yielding various behavioural outputs, even when we 
consider the production of verbal behaviour, or the common sense attribution of various 
propositional attitude states using natural language. 
 
Granted, in everyday practice, we continually employ sentences of public language to ascribe 
various content bearing mental states. But this is a projection from the 'outside'. The age-old 
customs of folk psychology are independent of any assumptions about internal symbols, 
states or structures. Observable behaviour and context are the relevant criteria, and the truth-
conditions for such ascriptions are founded on external, macroscopic and operational 
considerations. As in everyday life, one can use behavioural and environmental factors to 
adduce that, say, Jones believes that lager quenches thirst, but this practice makes no 
assumptions about the nature or even existence of an internal representation encoding the 
propositional content of the belief. The attribution concerns Jones as an unanalyzed unit, a 
black box whose actions take place within a particular environmental and linguistic setting. It 
gives no handle whatever on postulating hidden internal cogs, levers and teleosemantic 
functions that generate Jones’ actions. 
 
Hence it is vital to distinguish between the semantics of a public language such as English 
and the internal states and processes of English speaking cognitive agents. A la Putnam, there 
is nothing about the internal states of any English speaker that can determine meanings for a 
public language. And, a la the principle of psychological autonomy, there is nothing about 
the externally determined semantics of a public language that will impact behaviour, unless 
this is first manifested via a change to internal mechanisms. The actual workings of the 
human cognitive system can be naturalized, because they constitute a proper subsystem of the 
natural order. In contrast, the propositional content of public languages cannot be fully 
naturalized. Propositions are theoretical abstractions, highly normative and idealized 
extrapolations from human practice that transcend the boundaries of the actual. Indeed, a 
predominant position in formal semantics is to view them as characteristic functions of sets of 
possible worlds. And the formal definition of such functions is woefully underspecified by 
the brute facts of physical brain structure and natural selection. Mere terrestrial teleology is 
one thing, but how on earth could biological evolution select a function designed to yield XYZ 
thoughts on another planet?  
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
The efficacy of formal procedures implemented in physical configurations of matter and 
energy is not affected by the purported presence or absence of meaning, and I would argue 
that the computational paradigm is thematically inconsistent with the search for content or its 
supposed ‘vehicles’. Instead, the concern of computational models of cognition should be 
with the internal processing structures that yield the right kinds of input/output profiles of a 
system embedded in a particular environmental context, and with how such processing 
structures are implemented in the system’s physical machinery. These are the factors that do 
the work and in principle are sufficient to explain all of the empirical data, and they do this 
using the normal theoretical resources of natural science. Indeed, the postulation of content as 
the essential feature distinguishing mental from non-mental systems should be seen as the 
last remaining vestige of Cartesian dualism, and computational theories of cognition have no 
need for a semantical ‘ghost in the machine’. When it comes to computation and content, 
only the vehicle is required, not the excess baggage. 
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